Bringing Tax Avoiders to Light: Moral Framing and Shaming in a Public Goods Experiment
Autor: Stefanos A. Tsikas and Andreas Wagener
Nummer: 633, Jul 2018, pp. 47
JEL-Class: E62, H26, H30
Abstract:
With a series of public goods games in a 2x2-design, we analyze two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. Cooperation increases when non-contributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance. However, cooperation is only durable when free-riders are 'shamed' by disclosing their misdemeanor. We find shaming effects to be strong enough to make appeals to morality redundant for participants' decisions.
Zusammenfassung:
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