@TechReport{dp-354,
  author        = {Lohse, Tim and Julio R. Robledo and Ulrich Schmidt},
  astring       = {Tim Lohse and Julio R. Robledo and Ulrich Schmidt},
  title         = {Self-Insurance and Self-Protection as Public Goods},
  month         = {December},
  year          = {2006},
  pages         = {21},
  size          = {415},
  number        = {354},
  language      = {en},
  jelclass      = {G22, H41},
  keywords      = {self-insurance, self-protection, efficient provision of
                  public goods, private provision of public goods, market
                  insurance},
  abstract      = {Many public goods like dams, fire departments, and
                  lighthouses do not provide direct utility but act more as
                  insurance devices against floods, fire, and shipwreck. They
                  either diminish the probability or the size of the loss. We
                  extend the public good model with this insurance aspect and
                  generalize Samuelson's efficient allocation rule when
                  self-insurance and self-protection expenditures are pure
                  public goods. Some comparative static results with respect
                  to changes in income and risk behavior are derived. As some
                  of the sketched risks are insurable while some others are
                  not, we introduce further the possibility of risk coverage
                  by private market insurance. We analyze the interaction of
                  such an insurance with the public good level, both for
                  efficient provision and for private provision equilibria.
                  It turns out that the levels of self-insurance and
                  self-protection decrease when being privately provided.
                  Moreover, it appears a strategic substitutability between
                  the public good and market insurance which leads to an
                  additional decline of the provision levels.}
}