Measuring model risk

Philipp Sibbertsen‡, Gerhard Stahl§ and Corinna Luedtke‡

‡Leibniz University Hanover, Department of Economics, Germany
§Talanx AG, Hanover and Ulm University

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Abstract

Model risk as part of the operational risk is a serious problem for financial institutions. As the pricing of derivatives as well as the computation of the market or credit risk of an institution depend on statistical models the application of a wrong model can lead to a serious over- or underestimation of the institution’s risk. Because the underlying data generating process is unknown in practice evaluating the model risk is a challenge. So far, definitions of model risk are either application-oriented including risk induced by the statistician rather than by the statistical model or research-oriented and too abstract to be used in practice. Especially, they are not data-driven. We introduce a data driven notion of model risk which includes the features of the research-oriented approach by extending it by a statistical model building procedure and therefore compromises between the two definitions at hand. We furthermore suggest the application of robust estimates to reduce the model risk and advocate the application of stress tests with respect to the valuation of the portfolio.

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1 Introduction

Model risk emerged as a new risk category with the advent of elaborate and complex mathematical and statistical models during the late 1970s when Black, Scholes and Merton laid the path for a new field of science - mathematical finance. It is under the focus of various stakeholders of so-called internal models: regulators, rating agencies, investors, shareholders, bondholders, chartered accountants and the firm’s board. Therefore model risk can hardly be overestimated. A quote from a Sector Report of the UniCredit Group (2008), states that some investors "tend to apply an across-the-board discount of about 20% to the published numbers" due to investor skepticism and lack of transparency, giving the reader the flavor of its economic relevance.

The urge for better models stemmed from a riskier environment for financial institutions after the break-down of the Bretton Woods system and a steadily growing dependency of the world economy. Financial institutions were gradually exposed to higher risks and faced new risk categories. At the same time, the huge increase in computer capacity and ability led to better possibilities to calculate these models. An overview on the technical progress and its implication for financial markets is given in Marshall (2000). Alexander (2003) and Padoa-Schioppa (2004) show the rationale of regulation, especially of so-called internal models for banks. In 1998, regulatory authorities acknowledged these models for regulatory purposes. Since then they are wide-spread in practice.

But a model is only capable of capturing features of reality and is subject to the modeler’s preferences and abilities. And even high sophisticated models capturing stylized-facts such as volatility clustering or long memory are confronted with mapping errors when implemented in practice. The role of mapping errors is depicted in figure 1 where $X$ denotes the data set, $M$ is the estimator of the loss distribution, $\mathcal{D}_\rho$ is the domain and $\rho$ is the risk measure. The combination $\hat{\rho} = \rho \circ M : X \to \mathbb{R}$ allows for the direct computation of a risk measure estimate.
The final output of an internal model is a realization $x_{t+h}$ associated with a forecast distribution $L(\pi_{t+h} | I_t)$ and $L(\pi_{t+h} | I_t, Z_t)$, respectively, where $\pi_{t+h}$ denotes the variable of interest, typically a portfolio that is hold over a time span $h$. The forecast is drawn on possibly two of different type information sets. The first, $I_t$, comprises a history of risk factors, e.g. a time series of bond prices, say. The second, $Z_t$, which is typically used by insurances under Solvency II is of managerial type, e.g. management rules for splitting losses between shareholders and policyholders.

But this is only half of the output. The other is related to the valuation of $\pi_{t+h}$:

$\nu(\pi_{t+h})$.

Figure 2, taken from Baumgartner et al. (2004), shows the interplay between the model and the various valuations. From this representation one concludes that in the insurance industry mark-to-model valuation is a general approach for the evaluation $\nu(\pi_{t+h})$. Compared to those methods applied in the banking industry, an additional accounting step is applied.
Note that for both outputs, the forecast and the valuation, models and hence models risk are involved. Have in mind that forecast and valuation are two different problems. Whereas for the valuation the underlying probability distribution of the model is of interest in the forecast situation a complete forecast distribution is derived.

Derman (1996) was the first one who referred to model risk in the field of financial engineering by stating that models give at least a rough approximation of the reality. Given the relevance of that topic it is surprising that the number of publications devoted to model risk is rather small.

Rebonato (2001) defined model risk as "...the risk of occurrence at a given point in time (today or in the future) of a significant difference between the mark-to-model value of a complex and/or illiquid instrument held on or off the balance sheet of a financial institution and the price at which the same instrument is revealed to have traded in the market - by brokers’ quotes or reliable intelligence of third-party market transactions - after the appropriate provisions have been taken into account". This definition only refers to a financial instrument but neglects errors made when forecasting the value of the institutions’ portfolio. Note also that VaR models are large-scale models whereas pricing models are comparatively small.

We assume that model risk is the discrepancy between the implemented data generating process and the data at hand which can also be gathered in the future. In the following we
focus on a definition which comprises estimation errors and misspecification risks but we consider implementation risk only in so far as this type of error might contaminate our data.

The quantification of the model risk is also still in its infancy. This problem is most obvious in the context of financial risk management and portfolio valuation, especially of derivative instruments.

This paper aims at developing a working definition of model risk and giving an overview of the current practice of model risk quantification. Section 2 focuses on the main types the term model risk comprises. Sections 3 and 4 review the actual practice of model risk quantification in the market risk measurement and derivatives’ valuation context. Section 5 discusses robust methods to avoid model risk due to biased estimates because of data contaminations and sketches the application of stress tests. Section 6 concludes.

2 Types of model risk

Although the importance of model risk comes more and more into the focus of practitioners as well as researchers there is so far no clear notion of how model risk should be defined. Basically there are two different extreme notions of model risk. A more practice-oriented viewpoint is that everything which might be one way or the other related to the used statistical model is part of the model risk. This includes data contaminations as well as a wrong implementation or a wrong choice of starting values. Even a wrong application of the statistical model is seen as a source for model risk. This means that in this notion the behavior, preferences and abilities of the statistician herself are also seen as part of the model risk. For an overview of this notion of model risk see Crouhy et al. (1998).

Although a wrong implementation of the model is definitely a problem and a risk for the financial institution this should in our opinion not be part of the risk. Therefore, in our set-up these sources of risk are treated as part of the operational risk of the financial institution though not as part of the model risk.

The other line of definition is rather research-oriented and strictly mathematical (see Kerkhof
et al., 2002). They define a statistical model as a probability space. Although this approach allows for a high generality it does not seem to be handy for practical purposes. The probability space of a model uniquely defines a model and thus contains all the necessary information. However, it is a very abstract approach not giving inside into the actual statistical modeling procedure. This is mainly because a new parameter space is needed for every parameter constellation and model specification to avoid identification problems. Therefore, the set of valid probability spaces to be evaluated has to be massive and it is impossible to set it to sensible limits in most practical situations. Another drawback is that it focusses on the distributional properties whereas in the situation of forecasts the forecast distribution is not the relevant information as we will discuss later.

In our approach model risk can occur in different levels of the statistical modeling procedure. The first level is the model risk induced by the probability space which is captured by the definition of Kerkhof et al. (2002). On a second level the modeler has to draw conclusions which concrete econometric model specification is adequate. This is usually done by the application of various specification tests. However, it is well known that the chosen model can depend on the choice of tests applied to the data. Therefore, the choice of tests is a source of model risk as well. On a third level the modeler has to estimate the model parameters. The wrong choice of an estimator can also induce model risk.

Hence, our approach is somewhat in between these two extreme approaches. It comes from the believe that the usual procedure of measuring risk is to fit a model to the data at hand, either a portfolio of financial derivatives or a portfolio of credits or anything else, and then draw conclusions about possible losses based on the dynamics of the fitted model. By introducing a model all statistically relevant information such as a probability measure is given through the model implicitly. Model risk describes the risk that this fitted model is wrong. Thus, it does not draw any conclusions from the fitted model but measures the difference between the dynamics of the actual data and the fitted model. This understanding of model risk comes from the econometric modeling approach discussed for example in Clements and Hendry (1996).
We first give a rather broad definition of model risk which is in line with the definition of Crouhy et al. (1998):

**Definition 1.** *Every risk induced by the application of a statistical model is called model risk.*

It should be mentioned that under the notion "statistical model" we subsume statistical, stochastic as well as econometric models.

A more specific approach following a data-driven econometric modeling idea is:

**Definition 2.** *Every risk induced by the choice, specification and estimation of a statistical model is called model risk in the strict sense.*

We thus see model risk to be possibly introduced in one of three modeling steps.

**Remark:** This definition excludes every risk from "human failure". However, it still includes the risk induced by data contamination as this might lead to the use of robust procedures.

We assume a model based on a vector of observations \( x_t \) based on all variables in period \( t \).

Given \( X_t = (x_{t-1}, \ldots, x_1) \) the joint probability of \( x_t \) can be stated as

\[
\prod L(x_t|X_{t-1}; \Theta).
\]

This is in line with Kerkhof et al. (2002) who specify the model by a probability space. The concrete specification of the model contains of four steps including the estimation and specification steps from definition 2:

1. Marginalization of the data generating process;
2. Model specification with respect to the choice of variables;
3. Model specification with respect to the functional form;
4. Estimation of the parameters.
For further details see Cuthbertson et al. (1992). Errors can therefore occur for one of the following reasons:

- parameter change;
- model misspecification;
- estimation uncertainty;
- variable mismeasurement;
- initial condition uncertainty;
- non-modeled variable uncertainty;
- incorrect categorization of some variables as exogenous;
- lack of invariance to policy changes in exogenous variables;
- error accumulation.

This approach bridges the gap between the abstract notion of Kerkhof et al. (2002) and our more practical statistical modeling approach.
Table 1: This table summarizes main components of model risk. We would like to emphasize that our approach follows classical statistical reasoning. Others, e. g. Crouhy et al. (1998) consider the whole process in a more cybernating fashion by allowing the interaction of the statistician and the statistical model. Given the complexity of a VaR model we see no good way for a valid modeling. This might only be sensible for pricing models.

As outlined in Table 1 our data-driven modeling emphasizes two central tasks: choosing the functional form, and using the data to estimate the parameters. Model mismatch errors mirror the model’s inability to represent the data. Estimation errors end up in incorrect parameter values. The well-known bias-variance tradeoff hinders to reduce both errors from underfitting and overfitting simultaneously. Therefore, we assume that the principle of a parsimonious modeling is implicitly fulfilled. Note that overfitting will decrease the in-sample error, however the out-of-sample error will in general start to increase. The latter type of error is of particular importance for forecast distributions. Considering a forecast problem the model error is of minor importance, because forecast quality is judged by a function of the
forecast distribution and the realization:

\[ T(L(X_{t+h} | I_t), \nu(\pi_{t+h})). \]

Of course, model errors might deteriorate forecast quality. Note, that in Kerkhof et al. (2002) the model error is measured by a metric that compares different forecast distributions. We follow approaches summarized in Corradi and Swanson (2006).

Similar to other approaches our approach is not free of problems, too. To measure the risk induced by a model it has to be compared to an alternative model. To correctly specify the model risk you have to know an accurate model. However, accurate models are often hard to find. As we cannot always find an accurate model we need a benchmark model giving a close approximation to our data. The problem is how to choose this benchmark model. If we knew the model closest to our data we could easily use this model for risk measurement and model risk would no longer be a problem. Thus, finding a suitable benchmark model is a serious problem. However, it will hardly be possible to overcome this problem when discussing model risk.

In this respect the problem of quantifying model risk is closely connected to concepts of robust statistics where the influence of wrong data on an estimator or test is considered. These concepts are directly applicable in our set-up in the second and especially in the third step of the modeling procedure. If the data is contaminated the use of a robust estimator might be preferable as is discussed in section 5.

Statistical models in finance are basically used for two major applications: firstly they are used for the pricing of derivatives and secondly they are used to measure the market or credit risk of a financial institution. These two applications lead to different problems when measuring the model risk. Whereas in the first case the model has to be evaluated and thus slight departures of the model can lead to huge errors in the second case the model is used for forecasting. It should be mentioned that forecasts can be quite robust against model misspecifications. For a detailed discussion and an example see Hamerle and Rösch (2005).
3 Model risk when measuring risk

The development of sophisticated credit risk models is still a challenge to the risk management industry. Especially the issue of non-linear dependency of credit risks poses big problems. When using two different copulae or different correlations profit-/loss-distributions can deviate widely. The inherent model risk can hardly be quantified. The same problem holds for operational risks. Models for the quantification of market risk, however, are much more developed. Therefore, we concentrate on the model risk measurement for market risks. Portfolio risk can then be decomposed into market risk, estimation risk and misspecification risk.

Currently, the Basle Committee sets a multiplication factor of 3 in order to take model risk into account, see Stahl (1997). This approach was well-justified as the performance of VaR models through the 2001 crisis has shown, see Jaschke et al. (2007).

According to the coherence theory of Artzner et al. (1999) the calculated model risk measure should be added to the market risk measure to make a risky position acceptable.

There are two models which are used in the context of measuring the model risk inherent in market risk models: the Bayesian approach and the worst-case approach.

The Bayesian approach

Suppose that $\mathcal{K}$ comprises all candidate models to measure market risk. Then the following prior beliefs are necessary: the priors on the model parameters $\theta$ and the prior beliefs of the probability $P$ for all models $\mathcal{K}$ that this model is the true model. Then the Bayesian approach calculates the expected risk measure by taking the average over all candidate models $\mathcal{K}$. In the context of a model risk measure for market risk this means calculating VaR with different models, e. g. historical simulation, stochastic simulation and variance-covariance-approach and then calculating the average of the resulting VaR.

The strengths of this approach lie in its predictive ability and the stability of the resulting estimates. The main shortcomings of this approach consist in the difficulties to measure the priors and the probability of each model.
The Worst-Case Approach

Let a model $m$ be given and $\mathcal{M}$ is a class of models. A financial assets’ risk on a model $m$ is denoted by $\pi_m$. $\mathcal{K}$ is the tolerance set of all models that describe the alternative dynamics including the nominal model $m$. Model risk as for the worst-case approach is defined as the difference between the market risk measure of a nominal model and the market risk measure under the worst-case model, formally

$$\rho(\pi, m, \mathcal{K}) = \sup_{k \in \mathcal{K}} RM_k(\pi_k) - RM_m(\pi_m)$$

(see Kerkhof et al., 2002) where $\sup_{k \in \mathcal{K}} RM_k(\pi_k)$ is the worst-case risk measure. Suppose model risk is the sum of estimation risk and misspecification risk as defined in section 2. Estimation risk is the risk of choosing a wrong element $m(\hat{\theta})$ out of a model class $\mathcal{M}(\theta)$ even if the actual dynamics belong to it. One typically proceeds by defining a confidence region around the estimator $\hat{\theta}$. The risk of wrong estimation is also defined as model risk restricted to the model class whereas misspecification risk is unrestricted to $\mathcal{M}(\theta)$. The alternative dynamics can then be distinguished by a restricted tolerance set $\mathcal{K}_r$ and an unrestricted tolerance set $\mathcal{K}_u$.

This term can be non-negative. To overcome this weakness, the restricted tolerance set has to be nested within the unrestricted tolerance set, for example by forming convex combinations of models or by using a family of unrestricted tolerance sets which have been parametrized by a confidence level. Let $\alpha$ and $\mathcal{K}_r$ be given. Then $\mathcal{K}_u = \mathcal{K}_u(\gamma)$ with $\gamma = \min(\alpha, \sup_{\gamma \in (0, 1)} : \mathcal{K}_r \in \mathcal{K}_u(\gamma))$ (see Kerkhof et al., 2002). This approach fails in accurately quantifying the risk that stems from using a wrong model because the actual dynamics are still unknown. The approach equates the worst-case scenario risk measure with the risk under the worst case.

These considerations refer only to the first step of our modeling procedure. Kerkhof et al. (2002) focus on the comparison of forecast distributions when measuring model risk. Following the model building steps two to four in the previous section can reduce the model risk significantly by correctly specifying and estimating the model. Although each of these
steps can induce an error itself this modeling procedure will result in a model which is as adequate as possible in the sense that it gives a reliable forecast. Thus, our model building approach focusses on the comparison of forecast realization of the underlying data generating process or an adequate approximation of it and the specified model and therefore, goes beyond the Kerkhof approach.

4 Model risk when pricing derivatives

An important component of a financial institutions’ model risk results from the valuation of derivative instruments. In the context of option pricing, the importance of this topic becomes obvious when acknowledging for the fact that banks usually step into the (riskier) writer side of the option. The liability of the buyer is limited to the premium paid for obtaining the right to execute the option so that private investors prefer this side of the contract (see Green and Figlewski, 1999).

A huge number of pricing models have been proposed in the aftermath of the Black-Scholes and Merton model that account for stochastic volatility and the empirically-secured fact that the returns of the underlying asset exhibit excess kurtosis, i.e. extreme events are more likely than under the assumption of log-normal returns. Nonetheless, the Black-Scholes model is the most widely-applied model for valuing options (see Bakshi et al., 1997). Besides misspecifying the pricing rule, another crucial model risk source is related to the estimation of the required input parameters to value a derivative, especially the volatility which has to be forecasted. The modeler can choose between estimating the volatility from historical data, adopting conditional volatility models from the (G)ARCH-family or using the model-implied volatility.

A firm could limit its derivative risk by adopting coping strategies such as diversification, cash-flow matching or delta hedging (see Green and Figlewski, 1999) whereat the latter is the most common method.

To quantify the model risk induced by derivatives valuation the afore-described approaches
can be applied. The first method involves averaging over the option prices obtained from applying different pricing methods in the Bayesian framework. Another possibility would be to differentiate between market and model risk within the worst-case approach.

Let $S$ be the underlying of the option, $(H_i)_{i \in I}$ be its payoff and $(C_i^*)_{i \in I}$ is the current price observed in the market which ranges within a span $C_i^* \in [C_i^{bid} - C_i^{ask}]$. Denote model risk by a mapping $\mu : C \mapsto [0, \infty]$ and by $Q$ a pricing rule whose function is to relate the price of the underlying asset to the price of the derivative instrument under the assumption of no-arbitrage, i.e. the martingale representation should be fulfilled. $\lambda$ stands for the fraction of the spread attributable to model risk. Denote by

$$C = \{ H \in \mathcal{F}_T, \sup_{Q \in Q} E_Q[|H_i|] < \infty \}$$

a contingent claim for each model $Q$. Arbitrage freedom is secured by the martingale $G_t(\varphi) = \int_0^t \varphi_u dS_u$, where $(\varphi_t)_{t \in [0,T]}$ is a predictable process. Cont (2004) assumes that the price of a liquid plain-vanilla option forms itself within the interaction of supply and demand and contains no model risk. Hence, model uncertainty in the derivatives context is only a problem for over-the-counter (OTC) instruments whose price cannot be determined easily. Instead, a pricing rule needs to be applied to value an OTC-instrument.

The upper price bound of the contingent claim of the firm is defined as

$$\bar{\pi} = \sup_{Q \in Q} E_Q[X]$$

and the lower price bound as

$$\underline{\pi} = \inf_{Q \in Q} E_Q[X].$$

The result of applying a pricing rule will be a risk measure within the range spanned by the lower and upper bound. A model risk measure fulfilling the axioms above is then defined by

$$\mu_Q(X) = \bar{\pi}(X) - \underline{\pi}(X).$$
Hence, there would be no risk if the payoff is not influenced by model uncertainty,

\[ \tilde{\pi}(X) = \pi(X) \]

From these considerations it becomes clear that the model risk in the context of option pricing is measured by the comparison of distributions. This is in contrast to the type of model risk used for risk measurement. Have in mind that the distributions compared are specified by the model resulting from our model specification procedure given in section 2. Therefore, our framework covers this type of model risk as well.

Cont (2004) assumed that liquid options do not include model risk. This assumption is quite heroic as market maker assess a derivative price by using a valuation formula and thereby include model risk when calculating the option price.

\section{Model risk induced by contaminated data}

As described in section two there are different levels where model risk might occur. One important problem is a reliable parameter estimation. One common reason for wrong parameter estimates is contaminated data. This can be due to human failure or also simply because it is impossible to obtain uncontaminated data such as data including forward projections. Whatever is the reason it is well known that data contamination can lead to serious biases in the most commonly used estimators and therefore influence the model risk. The following example sheds some light on this phenomenon.

\textbf{Example 1. Estimation of corporate ratings}

In the following we consider a logistic model underpinning an internal rating system. The input data \( B_0 \) consists of balance sheet data of some thousand corporates over multiple years, which were coded such that:

\[ x_{ij} \in [0, 100] \equiv I, \quad (1) \]

where higher values correspond to higher risk. The associated variables to the realizations in
\(B_0\) are denoted by 
\[
D, X_1, \cdots, X_6.
\]

The probability \(\pi\) that a firm with characteristics \(x(t)\) defaults over time period \(t\) to \(t+1\), i.e.
\[
\pi = P(D(t+1) = 1|X(t) = x(t))
\]
is estimated via a logistic regression with parameter \(w\) (\(d\) is the response variable and \(x^*\) are the regressors)
\[
\pi = P(x, w) = \frac{e^{(w \cdot x^T)}}{1 + e^{(w \cdot x^T)}},
\]
(2)
where
\[
x^* = (1, x_1, \ldots, x_6), \quad w = (w_0, w_1, \ldots, w_6)
\]
and \(T\) denotes the transpose as usual.

Miskeyed values are one of the problems a modeler faces. According to (1) the range of values of the characteristics \(x_{ij}\) is a fixed interval. For the dataset at hand, however 1,5 % of the observations violate the condition imposed by (1) and approximately 4.5 % out of them are defaulted, i.e. \(d_i = 1\). Note that our analyses focus on those observations which are a priori known to be erroneous. Some additional uncertainty might be introduced by those erroneous observations remaining undetected initially.

In the following we consider three modifications of \(B_0\) – denoted by \(B_1, B_2, B_3\) – that fulfill (1).

\[
B_1 = \{x| x \in B_0 : x_{ij} \in I\},
\]
\[
B_2 = \{\tilde{x}| x \in B_0 : \tilde{x}_{ij} = x_{ij} \cdot 1 \big( x_{ij} \big) + 100 \cdot 1 \big( x_{ij} > 100 \big) \big( x_{ij} \big) + 0 \cdot 1 \big( x_{ij} < 0 \big) \big( x_{ij} \big) \},
\]
\[
B_3 = \{\tilde{x}| x \in B_0 : \tilde{x}_{ij} = x_{ij} \cdot 1 \big( x_{ij} \big) + x_{mj} \cdot 1 \big( x_{ij} \big) \},
\]
where \(1\) denotes the indicator function and \(x_{mj}\) denotes the median of characteristic \(x_j\). Note \(B_1 \subset B_0\), so the deletion approach loses some information. The mapping of outliers on the
interval bounds in $B_2$ is the modification that was actually chosen by the bank. Approach $B_3$ is motivated by simple imputation techniques. It substitutes false values by the median.

![Effect of one outlier](image)

Figure 3: For the data set $B_1$ the effect of one additional non-defaulted observation with extreme values in one of the characteristics is shown. The six graphics correspond to the six characteristics of the rating model. Each graphic shows the effect of an extreme outlier in the respective characteristic on obligor migration taking $B_1$ as a point of reference. The value of the outlier ranges from 100 to 1000. The interpolation of these points yields the graph.

As shown in Stahl et al. (2008) the impact of the different imputation techniques on the estimated $\hat{w}$ is statistically not significant. However, their impact on the parameter of interest, the rating of the corporate, might be of practical relevance, as the following Table shows:
Table 2: This table contains summary statistics of rating movements induced by choices of \( B(\cdot) \). The mean of the first row indicates an average move size of 0.39 rating grades with the third row showing that a fraction of 36% of movers are to be expected. The second row yields a standard deviation of slightly more than a half rating notch. Comparing the first row with the third shows that a move of more than one notch is rare. The extremes are given in the last row. The last column shows the summaries for a stress test which grades all obligors down by one notch except those already belonging to the worst non-default rating grade and the defaulted obligors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( \hat{\mu}(k) )</th>
<th>( \hat{\sigma}(k) )</th>
<th>Percentage of movers</th>
<th>Maximum move length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( B_0 )</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( B_1 )</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( B_3 )</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stress</td>
<td>0.9985</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>99.85</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The detailed analysis in Stahl et al. (2008) raised the question which impact an outlier might have on the misclassification of corporates. It is based on a sub-sample of size 999 from \( B_1 \) – where all wrong values were deleted – and one additional outlier was added, taking the values 200, 300, ..., 1000. Then the whole estimation process was repeated for every covariate. The following Figure shows that the covariates differ in respect to the sensitivity of the outlier. In any case the impact is highly relevant.

One way of overcoming this problem is the use of robust methods. In this section we give a brief review of the most common robustness concepts and estimators which are suitable to overcome model risk induced by data contaminations.

There are basically two different approaches to measure robustness, local and global robustness. Local robustness measures the effect of an infinitesimal deviation from the underlying distribution at any point to the applied estimator. Global robustness on the other hand says how many data points in the sample can be contaminated for the estimator not to break down.

Local robustness is measured in terms of the influence function of an estimator. In order
to define the influence function let $F$ denote a parametric family of distributions depending on the parameter $\theta$ to be estimated. Let $T(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ denote an estimator depending on a sample $x_1, \ldots x_n$. Furthermore, denote by $\Delta_x$ the one-point mass at $x$. The influence function of $T$ at the point $x$ is defined by

$$IF(x; T; F) = \lim_{t \downarrow 0} \frac{T((1-t)F+t\Delta_x) - T(F)}{t}.$$ 

Thus, the influence function measures the sensitivity of the estimator to infinitesimal deviations from the true distribution. A related robustness concept using the influence function is B-robustness where the $B$ stands for bias. A measure for B-robustness is the gross-error sensitivity defined by

$$\gamma^* = \sup_x |IF(x; T, F)|.$$ 

By the gross-error sensitivity the worst possible effect which a small contamination of a fixed size can have on the estimator is measured. It is thus an upper bound of the asymptotic bias of the estimator where the name of the measure comes from. For a more detailed overview over the influence function and related robustness concepts see Hampel et al. (1986).

When considering local robustness it is also of interest to consider global robustness. Global robustness is measured by the breakdown point which gives the fraction of observations which can be contaminated without effecting the estimator. Obviously, an optimal value to be achieved by a robust estimator is a breakdown point of 1/2. For the formal definition of the breakdown point let again $T$ be an estimator at the sample $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$. It is defined by

$$\varepsilon^*(T, x_1, \ldots, x_n) = \frac{1}{n} \max \{ m; \max_{i_1, \ldots, i_m} \sup_{y_1, \ldots, y_m} |T(z_1, \ldots, z_n)| < \infty \},$$ 

where the sample $(z_1, \ldots, z_n)$ is obtained by replacing the $m$ data points $x_{i_1}, \ldots x_{i_m}$ by the arbitrary values $y_1, \ldots, y_m$. The above version of the breakdown point is often also called finite-sample breakdown point to distinguish it from an asymptotic version which is not considered here.
Have in mind that this definition of the breakdown point covers only "explosion" of the estimator which might not be the only problem for an estimator. When estimating the variance also "implosion" to zero can be a problem. This can easily be covered by including the minimum and infimum in the definition as well. We will omit this here for the sake of notational simplicity. Thus, the above given version is especially designed for location estimators.

As model risk can be induced by local as well as by global robustness it is desirable to have an estimator which covers both problems. One possibility is the use of M-estimators. M-estimators are defined by satisfying the equality

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \psi(X_i, T) = 0,$$

where $\psi$ is any suitably chosen function. In order to guarantee robustness in any sense the function should be chosen to be redescending. A possible choice of $\psi$ guaranteeing $B$-robustness and a breakdown point of $1/2$ is Tukey’s biweight:

$$\psi(x) = x(r^2 - x^2)^2 1_{[-r,r]}(x)$$

for some value of $r$.

M-estimators have the undesirable property to be not scale-invariant. Therefore, Rousseeuw and Yohai (1984) introduced S-estimators based on minimization of a scale statistic rather than a location statistic. To define S-estimators define the scale statistic $s(r_1, \ldots, r_n)$ by

$$\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \rho\left(\frac{r_i}{s}\right) = K,$$

with some constant $K$ and the function $\rho$ to be chosen for instance so that its derivative is Tukey’s biweight. Then, the S-estimator of location $\hat{\theta}$ is defined by minimizing $s(x_1 - \theta, \ldots, x_n - \theta)$ over all $\hat{\theta}$. This gives simultaneously the scale estimate

$$\hat{s} = s(x_1 - \hat{\theta}, \ldots, x_n - \hat{\theta}).$$
The influence function of an S-estimator is equal to that of the location M-estimator and its breakdown point is $1/2$ as well. S-estimators were especially constructed for regression models and multivariate situations where they have good robustness properties. They are also well-understood in many other situations of practical interest. Sibbertsen (2001) derived for instance the properties of S-estimators under long-range dependencies and trends and showed their applicability in these situations.

As these are situations which are used in many econometric models for measuring risk these estimators seem to be a suitable choice to avoid model risk due to data contaminations in any respect.

Our exposition showed that a robust model merits consideration. Robust methods are useful when some outliers contaminate the data but the overall model assumptions can still be assumed to be valid. In times of crises this is not always the case as events are too extreme for any model to hold and the assumed model breaks down at all. Therefore, the modern risk management processes do not and cannot stop with the implementation of models devoted to measure risks. In order to capture these aspects of model risk so-called stress tests are run in practice. These are integral part of the risk management processes especially for such adverse developments where economic capital – the most important parameter derived from a VaR model – is of no help. The current liquidity crisis is a good example for that. Typically, stress tests are scenario-based calculations, where the scenarios represent extreme situations. Our robust framework is to a large extent immune against these extremes. Therefore, we propose to apply stress tests not for the determination of the forecast distribution, $L(X_{t+h} \mid I_t)$, but for the evaluation of the portfolio at hand.

One approach that would fit smoothly with our robust framework is the application of the configural sampling approach introduced by Morgenthaler and Tukey (1991). These authors suggest e. g. mixtures of Cauchy distributions and other extremes in the set of distribution functions in order to challenge estimators. This approach generalizes scenario-based stress tests to distribution-based ones. However this approach misses one of the major challenges in deriving stress tests: the requirement that they refer to extreme, however, still plausible situa-
tions. To that end recent contributions from Balkema and Embrechts (2007) seem promising. They define high risk scenarios by:

**Definition 3.** Given a random vector $Z$ in $\mathbb{R}^d$, for any closed halfspace $H$ in $\mathbb{R}^d$ with $P(Z \in H) > 0$ the high risk scenario $Z^H$ is defined as the vector $Z$ conditioned to lie in the half space $H$. If $Z$ has distribution $\mu$ then $Z^H$ has the high risk distribution $\mu^H$, where

$$d\mu^H(z) = 1_H(z) d\mu(z)/\mu(H).$$

It is shown that the multivariate Generalized Pareto distribution is the limit distribution for high risk distributions. In Bonti et al. (2007) a conditional approach that is in line with the spirit of this definition was implemented, however, further practical experiences have to be gathered in order to implement this new approach outlined in Definition 3.

## 6 Conclusion

Because of the more and more frequent use of sophisticated statistical models for measuring risk or pricing derivatives in financial institutions the problem of measuring the risk induced by the usage of a wrong model becomes more important. Even though practitioners as well as researches are aware of this increasing problem there is hardly any literature concerning this problem leave alone a unified approach and notion on what model risk actually is. In this paper we therefore aim to review the existing rather extreme approaches and develop a compromising notion of model risk which is driven by a data-oriented model building procedure. Our approach covers model risk when measuring the risk of a financial institution as well as model risk when pricing derivatives. In this respect our approach even extends the previous notions as they cannot distinguish between these two types of model risk and lack practical applicability when it comes to forecasting. In order to minimize the risk induced by our model
building strategy we furthermore propose the use of robust estimates when the data might be contaminated.

References


