@TechReport{dp-570,
  author        = {Fochmann, Martin and Jahnke, Bjoern and Wagener, Andreas},
  astring       = {Martin Fochmann and Bjoern Jahnke and Andreas Wagener},
  title         = {Does the Reliability of Institutions Affect Public Good
                  Contributions? Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment},
  month         = {February},
  year          = {2016},
  pages         = {46},
  number        = {570},
  size          = {577},
  language      = {en},
  keywords      = {Public goods, Experiment, Institutions},
  jelclass      = {H41, A13, C91},
  abstract      = {Reliable institutions -- i.e., institutions that live up
                  to the norms that agents expect them to keep -- foment
                  cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this
                  hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that
                  cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not
                  to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up,
                  groups that were told that "the system" had fended off
                  the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the
                  public good than groups that only learned that the attempt
                  did not affect their payoffs or that were not at all
                  exposed to corruption.}
}